An update for python-webob is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 Security Advisory openeuler-security@openeuler.org openEuler security committee openEuler-SA-2026-2679 Final 1.0 1.0 2026-06-12 Initial 2026-06-12 2026-06-12 openEuler SA Tool V1.0 2026-06-12 python-webob security update An update for python-webob is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 WebOb provides wrappers around the WSGI request environment, and an object to help create WSGI responses. The objects map much of the specified behavior of HTTP, including header parsing and accessors for other standard parts of the environment. Security Fix(es): ### Impact When WebOb normalizes the HTTP Location header to include the request hostname, it does so by parsing the URL that the user is to be redirected to with Python's `urllib.parse`, and joining it to the base URL. `urlsplit` (called internally by `urljoin`) however treats a `//` at the start of a string as a URI without a scheme, and then treats the next part as the hostname. `urljoin` will then use that hostname from the second part as the hostname replacing the original one from the request. In a previous advisory https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3 an attempt to fix this was made by forcing the replacement of `//` with `/%2f`, however this did not take into account that since Python 3.10 `urlsplit` internally strips ASCII tab, carriage return, and newline characters from the string, so `/\t/attacker.com` gets turned into `//attacker.com` and the attacker is able to bypass the changes introduced in that previous advisory, thereby bringing back the problem that was attempted to be fixed. ``` >>> parse.urlparse("//attacker.com/some/path") ParseResult(scheme='', netloc='attacker.com', path='/some/path', params='', query='', fragment='') ``` WebOb uses `urljoin` to take the request URI and join the redirect location to it, so assuming the request URI is `https://example.org/` and the URL to redirect to is `/\t/attacker.com/some/path/`: ``` >>> parse.urljoin("https://example.org/", "/\t/attacker.com/some/path/") 'https://attacker.com/some/path/' ``` Which redirects from `example.org` where we want the user to stay to `attacker.com`. ### Patches This issue has been fixed in WebOb 1.8.10. ### Workarounds Any use of the `Response` class that includes a `location` can be rewritten to make sure to always pass a full URI that includes the hostname to redirect the user to, or to validate that the redirect target starts with a scheme (e.g. `http://` or `https://`) before assigning to `Response.location`. ### References - https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3 - CVE-2024-42353 ### Thanks - Caleb Brown of Google(CVE-2026-44889) An update for python-webob is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1,openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4. openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of medium. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section. Medium python-webob https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2679 https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-44889 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44889 openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 python-webob-1.8.7-4.oe2203sp4.src.rpm python-webob-1.8.7-5.oe2403sp1.src.rpm python-webob-1.8.7-5.oe2403sp3.src.rpm python-webob-1.8.2-5.oe2003sp4.src.rpm python3-webob-1.8.7-4.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm python3-webob-1.8.7-5.oe2403sp1.noarch.rpm python3-webob-1.8.7-5.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm python2-webob-1.8.2-5.oe2003sp4.noarch.rpm python3-webob-1.8.2-5.oe2003sp4.noarch.rpm ### Impact When WebOb normalizes the HTTP Location header to include the request hostname, it does so by parsing the URL that the user is to be redirected to with Python's `urllib.parse`, and joining it to the base URL. `urlsplit` (called internally by `urljoin`) however treats a `//` at the start of a string as a URI without a scheme, and then treats the next part as the hostname. `urljoin` will then use that hostname from the second part as the hostname replacing the original one from the request. In a previous advisory https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3 an attempt to fix this was made by forcing the replacement of `//` with `/%2f`, however this did not take into account that since Python 3.10 `urlsplit` internally strips ASCII tab, carriage return, and newline characters from the string, so `/\t/attacker.com` gets turned into `//attacker.com` and the attacker is able to bypass the changes introduced in that previous advisory, thereby bringing back the problem that was attempted to be fixed. ``` >>> parse.urlparse("//attacker.com/some/path") ParseResult(scheme='', netloc='attacker.com', path='/some/path', params='', query='', fragment='') ``` WebOb uses `urljoin` to take the request URI and join the redirect location to it, so assuming the request URI is `https://example.org/` and the URL to redirect to is `/\t/attacker.com/some/path/`: ``` >>> parse.urljoin("https://example.org/", "/\t/attacker.com/some/path/") 'https://attacker.com/some/path/' ``` Which redirects from `example.org` where we want the user to stay to `attacker.com`. ### Patches This issue has been fixed in WebOb 1.8.10. ### Workarounds Any use of the `Response` class that includes a `location` can be rewritten to make sure to always pass a full URI that includes the hostname to redirect the user to, or to validate that the redirect target starts with a scheme (e.g. `http://` or `https://`) before assigning to `Response.location`. ### References - https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3 - CVE-2024-42353 ### Thanks - Caleb Brown of Google 2026-06-12 CVE-2026-44889 openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 Medium 6.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N python-webob security update 2026-06-12 https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2679